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Abstract 
This article examines the career and ideas of a late Mughal administrator, a Shi‘a 
Muslim called Ali Ibrahim Khan, who was appointed magistrate of the north Indian 
city of Banaras after its conquest by the East India Company in 1781, and remained in 
that position until his death in 1792. Engaging with recent research on legal pluralism 
on the one hand, and on legal and cultural intermediaries on the other, this paper 
examines the imagination of imperial, religious and legal spaces by this prolific 
historian, poet and legal ethnographer, an under-studied protagonist of the  process of 
transition to colonialism in India. Using a range of Persian-language manuscript 
sources in addition to archival and published material in Urdu and English, the article 
reveals the principles of Ali Ibrahim Khan’s pragmatic but principled efforts to 
reconcile recognisably Islamic legal principles and procedures with the demands of 
the emerging colonial situation, and his systematic reference to locality and custom in 
order to do so. 
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Reluctantly presiding over a trial in Banaras in 1781, Ali Ibrahim Khan, the British-
appointed magistrate of that recently conquered city, observed the procedures of a 
“trial by ordeal among the Hindus.”  Ali Ibrahim Khan’s detailed observations, which 
we can deem one of the earliest works of legal ethnography produced by an Indian, 
were accompanied by a typology of such ordeals, apparently gleaned from the 
Brahmin pandits attached to his court, and an appendix containing relevant extracts 
from a dharmasastric text, the Yajñavalka Smriti.  The result was an article in the first 
issue of the Asiatick Review, that epitome of scholarly and official Orientalism in 
India.
1
 
 
We might well have taken the events at Ali Ibrahim Khan’s court, and the 
resulting journal article, to be symptomatic of a distinctively colonial and modern 
method of dealing with cultural, religious and legal diversity, in which Indian society 
was taken to be composed of distinct and mutually exclusive religious collectives, 
each possessing a complete set of laws which had to inevitably apply to all its 
members but no others.
2
  We may also have taken this Muslim judge’s account as 
especially convincing evidence of the vitality and persistence of Brahminical 
knowledge and legal traditions, and indeed, of their formal incorporation within the 
legal structures of precolonial India.
3
 
 
However, this paper comes to a somewhat different conclusion, by considering 
not only the legal practices reported, but also the opinions expressed by the key 
protagonist—the judge himself.  Ali Ibrahim Khan noted that he had allowed the 
ordeal to be undertaken only after failing to convince the parties and his own advisory 
pandits (Brahmin scholar-experts) that such procedures, while appropriate in the 
realms of Hindu kings, were unsuitable within the territories of the Company.  While 
clearly curious about the eventual proceedings, and surprised by the outcome 
(whereby a man held a red-hot iron ball in his hand without being burnt, thus proving 
his innocence), Ali Ibrahim Khan remained unconvinced about the value of the 
practice for ascertaining the facts for a legal case.  He remanded the “appellor” 
(accuser in eighteenth-century English criminal law) to custody for a week, as a 
deterrent against further such demands for trial by ordeal, and continued to believe 
that “if such a trial could be seen once or twice by several intelligent men, acquainted 
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with natural philosophy, they might be able to assign the true reason, why a man’s 
hand may be burnt in some cases, and not in others.”4 
 
Ali Ibrahim Khan’s critical knowledge of Islamic and “Hindu” legal traditions, 
his reflections on their mutual relationship, and his repeated references to locality and 
sovereignty as determining legal principles, opens an unused window into the recently 
rejuvenated field of legal pluralism.  Legal pluralism, that is, separate laws for 
different parts of the population residing within the same overarching political and 
legal system, was a quintessentially imperial phenomenon.  Older studies of the 
phenomenon addressed the formal legal pluralism of French, Dutch and British 
empires—all of which officially recognised parts of various indigenous laws for the 
benefit of different groups of colonial subjects.
5
  Since the 1960s, on the other hand, 
the concept was also deployed to examine the hiatus between formal or state law and 
other effective moral codes, especially those that “plebeian” society lived by.6  
 
The most recent literature on imperial history and legal pluralism, exemplified 
by the ambitious work of Lauren Benton, has moved our understanding beyond both 
formal legal pluralism with “neatly stacked” legal systems, as well as a binary 
opposition between state and non-state law.  Instead, Benton has offered a vision of 
uneven legal geographies, replete with maritime corridors, treacherous waterways, 
sudden fissures and inaccessible highlands across which litigants adroitly “jockeyed” 
for maximum gains.
7
 This literature encourages us to think about “jurisdiction” as a 
legally structured, but also fractured and contested space, on which rested the 
precarious but violent reality of empires.   
 
Benton’s conception also allows us to investigate the perceptions and actions 
of those petty legal authorities, the indigenous law officials—the limits of whose 
agency may be open to debate, but whose experiences, practices and beliefs certainly 
provided the everyday texture of imperial law.  While close attention to European 
legal thought has enriched the intellectual history of empire, or at least the European 
conceptions of it,
8
 and rich studies of colonial litigants have revealed both clashes of 
expectations and scope of subaltern agency, little is known about the “jurispractice,”9 
or situational rationales of indigenous legal officials—who in their own persons and 
actions straddled the boundary between state and society.  Recognising that these 
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“little men” were also thinkers, and that they drew on rich cultural and intellectual 
resources in their conceptions of empire, allows us to build upon and transcend the 
social history of colonial manpower.
10
  Quite like certain Berber notables, whose 
personal and intellectual negotiation of the fraught Catholic-Islamic world of the 
sixteenth-century Mediterranean has received significant attention,
11
 late 
Mughal/early colonial judges and administrators have much to tell us about how 
empire was not only perceived and experienced but actuated in India in the late 
eighteenth century.
12
 
 
Studying the very court that Ali Ibrahim Khan presided over, Radhika Singha 
argued for the Weberian role of colonial law, buttressing the colonial state’s exclusive 
claim to legitimate violence.  In her richly textured study, she also demonstrated how 
that claim was eventually compromised, both in deference to Indian sensibilities and 
in the interest of order.
13
  Assuming a more dialogic model (but in a different way 
from Singha), Robert Travers has shown how British justifications as well as critiques 
of the East India Company’s empire in India in the eighteenth century shoehorned 
what had been learnt about Indian laws and political principles into the English 
political theory of “ancient” and inviolable “constitutions,” which alone gave 
legitimacy to political power.
14
  In continuing to pay attention to the process of 
intellectual and social layering of imperial regimes, this article turns from British 
jurists and Residents to a thoughtful as well as powerful Indian protagonist.  
Fortunately for us, and unusually for a man “between worlds,” Ali Ibrahim Khan, 
being a prolific poet, literary critic, historian, avid letter-writer and aspiring jurist, has 
left us copious records of his thoughts and experiences, from which we can deduce 
not just angst and the urge to negotiate moral, legal and political borders, but his 
methods and principles for doing so.   
 
Deducing those principles draws us ineluctably into the usually distinct field 
of Islamic law in South Asia.  Scholarship produced since the 1980s has hugely 
enhanced understanding of Islamic law as an evolving jurisprudential tradition,
15
 
continuously developed by specialist scholars, fuqaha, who, as part of the larger body 
of learned, or ‘ulama, have proved perfectly capable of adapting to altered social and 
institutional circumstances.
16
  While scholars of Islam in South Asia have repeatedly 
pointed to the diversity, in general, of “Islam in practice,”17 the many sources of 
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“Islamic” codes of thought and practice,18 and the constant “ambiguity” in adherence 
to shari‘a (or deviation from it),19 it is now time to return attention to the practice of 
Islamic law in India, before its jurisdiction was truncated by colonial rule, and before 
it became a species of family law and a marker of community identity.
20
  With 
insights derived from studies in the “high” Mughal period,21 we can begin to 
understand how a Shi‘a Muslim poet-jurist-administrator might negotiate the 
emergent political terrain of nested empires in late eighteenth-century Bengal and 
Banaras.   
 
Setting the Scene: The man and his context 
Ali Ibrahim Khan was born around 1730 in an old and highly regarded Shi‘a family of 
Azimabad (Patna).
22
  Nephew of a jurist and judge and grandson of a scholar,
23
 he 
turned out to be an administrator, diplomat, legal commentator, judge, poet and 
literary critic—of Persian and Rekhta (proto-Urdu) poetry.24  Ali Ibrahim Khan figures 
several times in the eighteenth-century Persian-language histories, especially with 
regard to his life and career prior to his appointment in Banaras.  This was no doubt 
because he was very well known to the administrator-historians who authored these 
works, and was even married to the daughter of one of them.
25
 
  
Ali Ibrahim Khan’s career stretched across a number of the eighteenth-century 
states that rose in north India in the wake of the emasculation of the Mughals, and he 
was personally known to the royal families of Bengal, Awadh, the Maratha 
confederacy and the Mughals themselves.
26
  When ten years old, he was taken from 
Patna to Murshidabad in 1740 together with other skilled administrators by Nawab 
Ali Vardi Khan,
27
 the Persian deputy-governor of Bihar who usurped the Nawabi of 
Bengal.
28
  He witnessed the revolution of 1757, which turned the East India Company 
into king-makers in Bengal.  He then worked in important administrative positions 
under Nawab Mir Qasim, negotiated on behalf of the latter with the British and the 
Nawab of Awadh, weathering the battlefields of Buxar in 1765.  Next, he moved on to 
working under another Shi‘a bureaucrat, Muhammad Reza Khan, naib-nazim in the 
dual system of Indian-run and British-managed government in Bengal after the grant 
of Diwani,
29
 and rendered Reza Khan invaluable assistance when the latter was 
accused of corruption in a politically-motivated trial spearheaded by Warren 
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Hastings,
30
 before eventually falling out with him over the patronage of a particular 
dancing girl.
31
   
 
Hastings, who had been sent to Bengal in order to abolish the dual system of 
government, and assert unqualified Company authority, proved to be the most durable 
patron for Ali Ibrahim Khan, and Khan received his biggest career break in 
connection with one of Hastings’ most controversial operations—the takeover of the 
Banaras zamindari in 1781.  Banaras was a “little kingdom”—a zamindari risen from 
a family of Bhumihar Brahmin revenue farmers subordinate to the Nawabs of 
Awadh—the latter themselves shaking off centralised Mughal control from the 1720s.  
These tax-collecting henchmen turned rebellious upstarts,
32
 fended off attacks by 
other local warlords, attacked or ignored Oudh officials, wooed the tottering Mughals 
and the ambitious Marathas, and with the support of the East India Company wrested 
increasingly greater recognition of autonomy from Awadh, in 1752, 1757, 1764 and 
1765.
33
  The initial strategy of the Company was to extract tribute rather than to 
govern directly.  It was only when a Banaras raja, Chait Singh, refused to produce an 
additional “extraordinary” annual contribution of five hundred thousand rupees and a 
regiment of two thousand horsemen to subsidise Anglo-French wars that the question 
of British sovereignty over this territory became an important matter, to be tested 
through force of arms. 
 
In the ensuing confrontation in 1781, Chait Singh was routed.  Banaras came 
under British control and Ali Ibrahim Khan found himself a job as the magistrate of 
the city.  It was in that capacity, negotiating the theoretical and asserted claims of 
many past and present rulers—the British, the Rajas of Banaras, the Nawab of Awadh, 
and the turbulent Maratha chiefs—that he penned his historical, legal and literary 
works, in all cases attempting to reconcile territorially expansive and vigorously 
debated claims of authority and expertise to local tastes and necessities.  In 
understanding the work and vision of Ali Ibrahim Khan, judge-magistrate, 
ethnographer, poet, literary critic and historian, it is essential to consider all the genres 
of writings through which he imagined space, and justice in it.   
 
Being the Observer: Judge in a city of “many religions” 
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After 1781, the Rajas of Banaras lost many of their “royal” prerogatives—including 
the right to maintain order, to dispense justice and to control the mint,
34
 several of 
these functions being amalgamated in the newly created post of Chief Magistrate in 
Banaras—to which Hastings appointed Ali Ibrahim Khan.  Hastings noted the 
particular challenges of dispensing justice in Banaras—buzzing with temples, 
pilgrims, trade and rich pensioners, and a significant place for both Hindus and 
Muslims.  Hastings deemed Khan just the man for such a job, with his “moderation, 
disinterestedness, and good sense,” that is, his lack of bigotry as well as ambition.  In 
order to meet his challenges, Khan was provided with a handsome salary of 2,500 
rupees a month, and set atop the Kotwali (police station), the criminal or Faujdari 
Adalat and the civil or Diwani Adalat.  The two latter, presided over by daroghas, 
were provided with legal experts—maulavis and pandits—but the final appeal lay with 
Ali Ibrahim Khan.
35
  
 
It was in this context that Khan produced the extraordinary document 
discussed at the beginning of this article—a critical ethnography of the practice of 
ordeals under Hindu law.
36
  A very significant portion Ali Ibrahim Khan’s criticisms 
can be called “jurisdictional”—he reported having tried long and hard (over four 
months, in fact) to convince his own court pandits and the parties that such a mode of 
securing evidence was “not conformable to the practice of the Company’s 
government,” and having suggested a non-sanguinary oath instead—“by the waters of 
the Ganges or the leaves of the tulasi in a little vessel of brass, or by the book 
Herivansa [sic., Harivamsa], or the stone Salgram, or by the hallowed ponds… all 
which oaths are used at Benares.”37  In the end, in the face of obstinate insistence, he 
reported having given in, on the basis that the parties were Hindus, the procedure was 
explicitly sanctioned by the dharmasastras, that it was utilised in the territories of 
[other] Hindu rajas and, charmingly, because he was curious about the outcome.  
Khan found himself amazed by the accused emerging unscathed, but refused to 
relinquish his scepticism—continuing to believe that this was a trick with a natural 
explanation.   
 
Wherein arose Ali Ibrahim Khan’s scepticism and disapproval?  We can compare 
his comments to those of his erstwhile patron, Muhammad Reza Khan.  Ten years 
ago, in 1772, Reza Khan, then battling the growing encroachment on his authority by 
© 2014 Nandini Chatterjee and The Johns Hopkins University Press 
the Company Government headquartered at Calcutta, had vehemently rejected 
Hastings’ proposal of separate laws for Hindus and Muslims, or of associating 
Brahmin judges with a proper (that is, Islamic) court.  While revealing similar rich 
knowledge regarding the contents and regional specificities of “Hindu laws,” and 
suggesting that people could choose alternative arbitration forums if they so preferred, 
Reza Khan had insisted that 
the Gentoos are subject to the true faith and to order a magistrate of the 
faith to decide in conjunction with a Brahmin would be repugnant to 
the rules of the faith—and in a country under the dominion of a 
Mussulman emperor it is improper, that any order should be issued 
inconsistent with the rules of his Faith, or that innovations should be 
introduced in the administration of justice.
38
 
 
Times had moved on since Reza Khan’s fruitless protest, and Ali Ibrahim 
Khan was well aware of the expectations of his employers.  Indeed, he was astute 
enough to assert his jurisdictional claim (that such procedures were alien to his court) 
not on the basis of Islam, but on the basis of colonial authority.  Indeed, in the 
turbulent city of Banaras, frequented by many would-be empire-builders, the 
jurisdiction of his court and the sanctity of his preferred court procedures had to be 
based on the Company’s authority and its alleged norms of legal procedure.  When 
formidable Maratha sardars and their henchmen took it upon themselves to imprison 
their debtors, and occasionally kill them while in “custody,” Ali Ibrahim Khan’s best 
bet, following frustrating requests to bring the dispute to his court, was to rely on the 
British Resident to lean on the Maratha general, who in turn, predictably asserted his 
own royal claims and equivalence (“friendship”) with the British.39  The pandits, on 
the other hand, were the Company’s servants, just like himself—and it is notable that 
Ali Ibrahim Khan here deployed the jurisdictional argument to support his own 
interpretation of what the Company’s legal norms required of court procedure.   
 
His capitulation, albeit after a considerable period of reflection (and no doubt, 
effort to pressurise his opponents), as well as the reasons proffered for this change of 
heart, suggest a new sensibility of legal pluralism—one that recognised “Hindu law” 
as a separate entity, formally and inevitably applicable to certain kinds of legal 
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subjects (Hindus), given certain textual prescriptions (in the dharmasastras).  
Certainly, the textual emphasis was completely new—for although there existed by 
that time an eight-hundred-year-old tradition of Muslim commentary on Hindu 
religious practices, including commentaries on Hindu salvific doctrines and bio-
spiritual exercises (especially yoga),
40
 and monumental translations of epics and 
ethical-philosophical texts sponsored by the Mughals,
41
 there does not appear to have 
been a single Persian translation of the dharmasastras or their commentaries until the 
Code of Gentoo Laws began to be prepared under British patronage.  What is 
particularly striking is that Ali Ibrahim Khan felt it necessary to name not just his 
advisors, but quote from the texts they cited—appending the relevant section from the 
Yajñavalka Smriti, “verbally translated,” perhaps by the same authorities.  As such, he 
can be seen as an active participant in the much-studied process of colonial 
textualisation of Indian legal traditions.
42
  
 
Nevertheless, he retained other principles that allowed him to critically 
transcend such legal sectarianism.  These were the principles of “natural philosophy,” 
and the nature of realms.  While I have not been able to trace the exact intellectual 
lineage of Mulla Nasir, Ali Ibrahim Khan’s maternal grandfather, nor identify with 
confidence the Shirazi scholar with whom Mulla Nasir reportedly travelled to Shiraz 
for his studies, the likelihood of his having been influenced by emigrant Shi‘a Usuli 
(or rationalist, interpretive, clerical authority–oriented) ‘ulama is very high.  In the 
early eighteenth century, many such Usuli families, losing the dominance they had 
enjoyed in Safavid Iran, moved to India, first to Bengal and then to Awadh.
43
  
Eventually, such scholars would come to impose a rationalist and clericalist 
orientation on the Awadh state in the early nineteenth century.
44
  But if not 
specifically Shi‘a, a rationalist-empiricist approach aimed at training experts in 
adjudication and administration was already manifest in the hugely popular 
curriculum called Dars-i Nizamiyya which was taught at and disseminated by the 
Firangi Mahall madrassa at Lucknow, endowed by the Mughal emperors.
45
  
Moreover, Banaras was the adopted home of Shaikh Muhammad Ali “Hazin” Gilani, 
the irascible Usuli jurist, poet and literary critic.  We have evidence that Ali Ibrahim 
Khan appreciated and endorsed Hazin’s poetic opinions, whatever he may have 
thought of his jurisprudence.
46
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As Ali Ibrahim Khan said, Hindu ordeals, with impeccable scriptural standing 
but of dubious rationality, may be acceptable in the realms of Hindu kings—and we 
shall discuss later whom he meant—but not in the Company’s lands.  His 
recommendation of oaths instead of ordeals is interesting for two reasons.  While 
superficially the oaths recommended sound similar to the multireligious pledges 
essayed in the English Mayor’s Courts from the mid-eighteenth century,47 Ali Ibrahim 
Khan’s preference for them was conditional.  In a case such as this (alleged theft), 
oaths were acceptable, undoubtedly because they were a valid form of evidence under 
Islamic law.
48
  On the other hand, Ali Ibrahim Khan would later vociferously oppose 
the administration of similar oaths to court officials—an opposition Radhika Singha 
incisively showed to be linked to questions of status and public standing.
49
  Thus, 
while unacceptable as humiliating public trials of probity for important officials, oaths 
could be satisfactorily administered to under-trials, be usefully distinguishable by 
religion (thus catering to British sensibilities), and leave both Ali Ibrahim Khan’s 
scepticism and Islamic legal procedure unscathed.   
 
Thus in referring to local custom (over religious scriptures), Ali Ibrahim Khan 
may have been attempting to avoid ideological confrontation with his employers, the 
British (and their vision of multiple religion-based legal traditions), while also 
maintaining recognisable Islamic legal procedure, by, not despite, reference to local 
custom.  Brahmanical scriptural-legal texts, on the other hand, remained suspect, and 
susceptible to his rationalist criticism, possibly from an Usuli intellectual position that 
foregrounded rationality, and the right of juristic interpretation by appropriately 
trained experts.   
 
Custom as Justice: Ali Ibrahim Khan on commercial law 
Despite this strategy of rationalist detachment, and his unquestionable diplomatic 
skills, as Hastings’ power and patronage receded, Ali Ibrahim Khan found himself 
pushed into taking more oppositional positions with other British superiors, jealous of 
his position in the city and court.  Quite plausibly, Francis Fowke, the then British 
Resident, saw in him an instrument of Warren Hastings’ open hostility.50  A 
subsequent Resident, Jonathan Duncan, well known to South Asianists through the 
works of Cohn and Singha,
 
proved to be a greater challenge.  During their barely 
concealed conflicts, Ali Ibrahim Khan was moved to articulate more autonomous 
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lines of legal interpretation, in which the validity local custom, once again, proved to 
be his most valuable principle. 
 
Appointed in 1787, Duncan proceeded to produce a voluminous survey of the 
revenues, government and legal structure of Banaras, together with recommendations 
for important changes in policy, many resulting in a constraining of Ali Ibrahim 
Khan’s power.  In general, despite Ali Ibrahim Khan’s efforts, Duncan still found the 
legal structures of the region rickety and barely functional.
51
  Duncan noted qazis who 
had been without regular arrangements for payment for several years, and the 
complete absence of any revenue courts (revenue had been left under the raja’s 
jurisdiction).  There was said to be a functioning mulki (country/royal) adalat under 
the Banaras raja’s jurisdiction (and manned by a qazi) which mainly dealt with 
inheritance cases.   
 
As for Ali Ibrahim Khan himself, Duncan noted that while Khan was a good 
man and a good judge, he tended towards softness and procedural laxity, even if such 
flexibility was in keeping with local cultural expectations.  As part of his package of 
legal reform, Duncan suggested making Ali Ibrahim Khan’s court subordinate to that 
of his own (as the Resident).  He explained that making Khan’s decisions “subject to 
an appeal would obviate his [Khan’s] reliance so much on untrustworthy judges of 
civil and criminal courts who were taking undue advantage of his liberality because 
the idea of an appeal would make Ali Ibrahim Khan pay stricter attention to the 
proceedings of the courts under him.”52  
 
Earlier in the year in which he produced his report (1788), Duncan had toured 
the zamindari in the company of the raja, and instituted three new town courts, at 
Ghazipur (Maulvi Amirullah), Jaunpur (Mufti Karimullah) and Mirzapur (Lala Bakshi 
Singh)—the last appointment apparently aimed at pleasing the important Hindu 
commercial groups of that city.
53
  In each of these judicial establishments, the judges 
were directed to apply Hindu law to Hindus and Islamic law to Muslims, as far as 
civil causes were concerned (in direct reference to regulations adopted in Bengal in 
1772), and were each provided with a full establishment, including a maulvi and two 
pandits as assessors.  In spite of this provision for expert advice, the judges expressed 
some bewilderment about the requirements of their position and role.  For example, 
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soon after their appointments, all these judges wrote to Jonathan Duncan, seeking 
clarifications—about their jurisdiction, their relationship with existing qazis and 
muftis, and the applicable laws and procedure.
54
  Unsurprisingly for an important 
commercial centre, several of these questions were about financial instruments.  
Bakshi Singh of Mirzapur asked whether there were time limitations for claiming 
back mortgaged property,
55
 and Muhammad Nasir ud-din, judge of the Mulki Diwani 
Adalat (an older judge not appointed by Duncan) asked the same question with regard 
to debt recovery.
56
  
 
The issues of mortgage and limitations were complex enough for Duncan to 
refer them to Ali Ibrahim Khan for his expert comments.  Ali Ibrahim Khan 
proceeded to explain what, “according both to the Mohammedan and Hindoo law 
[were] the nature, rates and practice of mortgages as observed in the City of Banaras 
and throughout the Zemindary appertaining to it.”  Translating the term mortgage as 
“rahen” [sic] in Mohammedan law, and “bandhak” in Hindu law, he once again 
acknowledged colonial assumptions regarding mutually exclusive legal systems, 
marked by religion, categories and language.  However, this gesture was then 
transcended by his categorisation of the commercial device by the conditions attached 
to it—which appeared identical in the two allegedly distinct legal systems.  He noted 
that there were “rahens” with and without time limitations attached, and that while 
time-limited “rahens” could lead to sale of the mortgaged property in case of default, 
there were differences of opinions among the ‘ulama regarding such forced sales (bai‘ 
al-wafa) of ‘pledged’ property.  Similarly, he offered “girow” [sic; girwi] and 
“bandhak” as corresponding legal terms from within Hindu law, once again pointing 
out that these varied according to whether or not a profit was derived from them (for 
instance through use of the property mortgaged) and whether or not it was time-
limited.    
 
Noting that Warren Hastings had himself sought his (Ali Ibrahim Khan’s) 
opinion regarding the time-limitation of causes related to mortgages, Khan reiterated 
his earlier advice against the blanket adoption of an effective statute of limitations.  
He argued that a rigid doctrine of time-limitation would consist of injustice, given the 
variety of commercial transactions encompassed by the blanket term “mortgage”—
and the range of time-related provisions in the existing laws, both Hindu and Islamic, 
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which people in Banaras were familiar with.  He also felt that a rigid doctrine of time-
limitation would strengthen the hands of the wealthy, powerful and unscrupulous.  For 
example, the mortgagee may have discouraged payment in order to keep using the 
property, and the mortgager, especially if poor, may not have been able to raise the 
repayable amount in twelve years (the envisaged period of limitation).  Similarly, 
unscrupulous usurpers of property could forge mortgage deeds and claim long-term 
possession; without judicial investigation, such usurped property could never be 
retrieved.
57
  
 
In this response, Ali Ibrahim Khan revealed a sensitive understanding of a 
variety of commercial devices, as well as the situational uses and abuses of legal 
provisions in a vibrant commercial centre of eighteenth-century northern India.  We 
have extensive evidence of the widespread use of rahn, by both Hindus and Muslims, 
these transactions being recorded under the seal of the qazi in ubiquitous rahn-namas 
from all major commercial centres of northern, western and central India, at least 
from the seventeenth century.
58
  Khan chose to represent the device as deriving from 
distinct legal traditions, Hindu and Muslim, not only distinguished by language (rahn 
and bandhak) but also in terms of textual sources.  As far as Islamic law was 
concerned, he referred accurately to debates among Indian ‘ulama over loopholes that 
permitted usury.
59
  Suppressing this contentious debate over Islamic prohibition of 
usury, Ali Ibrahim Khan simply noted that rahns were mortgages, that in some cases 
could be transformed into effective sales called bai‘ al-wafa.  Thus Khan invested his 
energy in retaining the customary safeguards against misuse of this undoubtedly 
popular device, rather than risk fruitless jurisprudential debate over the merits of 
usury with a trading company.  In doing so, he referred to the local realities of 
commercial practice, and posed the legitimacy of established customs of the region 
against a codifying approach that would impose a rigid time-limit on claims that 
required greater flexibility in order to be socially equitable.  Although acknowledging 
the categories of “Hindu” and “Muslim” and indeed, the distinct body of 
jurisprudence that related to Islam, the legal traditions he sought to defend in this 
instance derived from locality and familiarity (being customary), rather than any 
abstract community defined by law. 
 
Being the Mufti: Situational legal interpretation and judicial practice 
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On another occasion in the same year (1788), Khan was called upon to comment upon 
the far more contentious matter of mutilations as punishment in Islamic criminal 
law.
60
  This was a case of robbery, which had been adjudicated by the more severe 
Nasir ud-din at the Mulki Adalat.  Two lower-caste men had snatched a nose-ring 
from a Marwari woman performing the panchkosi pilgrimage through the city in the 
company of her family.  The miscreants had been caught by the woman’s brother, 
who also turned them over to the Mulki Adalat.  Both men were known criminals, 
convicted on several previous occasions despite having signed bonds of good 
behaviour.  Nasir ud-din sentenced them to amputation of a hand and the diagonally 
opposite foot on the basis that such was the non-negotiable (hadd) punishment for 
highway robbery.
61
  The Resident, obviously unhappy with the judgment, consulted 
Ali Ibrahim Khan, who adroitly avoided questioning the legal provision itself, and 
questioned instead the construction of facts.  Disputing that robbery in broad daylight, 
within the precincts of the city, could be construed as highway robbery, he 
recommended understanding the act as a simple act of theft, subject to discretionary 
punishment—in this case, beating and imprisonment.62  
 
Radhika Singha has demonstrated how, in the context of widespread social 
turbulence, Islamic law officers employed in the Company’s courts were required to 
extract a monolithic law of homicide and punishment, eliminating the many 
conflicting opinions and conditions which hindered the application of the death 
penalty for murder.  This process, of which Ali Ibrahim Khan was a part, offers us 
tantalising glimpses into a working Islamic legal system, with recognisable 
procedures of selection of appropriate principles from a variety of texts, and the often 
contradictory opinions of past masters, by juriconsults (muftis) for the benefit of a 
judge (qazi) dealing with a specific case.
63
  Placed within that broader jurisprudential 
and legal context, we can understand the objections expressed by a number of judges, 
including Ali Ibrahim Khan himself, to British extensions and interpolations to the 
Islamic laws pertaining to homicide.  In 1791, for example, when refusing to accede 
to a sentence of transportation of a certain Bhisoo, Ali Ibrahim Khan said that where 
the 
slain party hath no relations, either near or remote—in respect to 
whatever hath conformably to law attached, either of Kisas [retaliation] 
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or Deeit [compensation], on the slayer in lieu of the slain, the Hakim 
[judge] is empowered, in such manner that the Hakim is authorized in 
regard to the completion of the Kisas or Deeit, whatever shall have 
justly attached on the slayer… but to send him in such a cause as the 
present to Pulo Penang will not fall in with the Shira or law [sic], 
because such a Rowayet, or legal opinion, hath not been found in the 
books.
64
 
 
In the case transferred from Nasir ud-din’s court, on the other hand, Ali 
Ibrahim Khan discovered sufficient reasons within Islamic law to modify a sentence 
comprising a hadd punishment.  Considered on its own, one may have been tempted 
to see his decision as a product of his willingness to accommodate British sensibilities 
about the barbarity of mutilation, possibly even his sharing them.  However, Ali 
Ibrahim Khan’s reference to the location of crime resonates with the conditions 
recited in the Fatawa-i ‘Alamgiri regarding what comprised quta‘ al-tariq or rahzani 
(highway robbery)—that the crime had to be committed far from cities and villages 
(there being some unclearness whether the required distance was one full day’s 
travelling distance or three)—this opinion said to be in line with the zahir al-
riwayah—or the consensus among scholars (of a particular school).65  The eminent 
Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf had apparently mentioned the possibility of the distance 
qualifications being overridden when the crime was committed at night.
66
  
 
In coming to their respective conclusions, then, Nasir ud-din and Ali Ibrahim 
Khan chose to rely on different opinions from within the Hanafi mazhab (school of 
law), as it was perfectly legitimate for them to do according to Islamic jurisprudential 
methods.  In fact, Ali Ibrahim Khan seems to have veered towards the majority 
opinion, whereas Nasir ud-din had chosen a relatively isolated opinion as more 
appropriate for the case at hand.  What would however be unique about the situation 
is a man such as Ali Ibrahim Khan, who was not expressly trained as a an expert in 
law (fiqh), and who in fact, never applied the term “qazi” or Islamic judge to himself, 
always choosing the more generic “hakim” instead, should have in this instance 
appropriated the role of a juriconsult (mufti).  There is a lively and ongoing debate 
among scholars of Islamic law regarding to principal locus of legal interpretation in 
© 2014 Nandini Chatterjee and The Johns Hopkins University Press 
Islamic law—and whether this is the qazi or the mufti.67  Whatever the outcome of 
that debate, it is perhaps not unreasonable to speculate that the novelty of the colonial 
situation allowed an administrator such as Ali Ibrahim Khan to combine in himself 
both roles, in a performance that approximated to the model of a just king rather than 
merely a conscientious judge. 
 
Of Kings and History: Ali Ibrahim Khan in Bengal, Awadh and Banaras 
It is time, then, to return to Ali Ibrahim Khan’s strongly felt notion that it was kings 
that gave laws to a realm.  How then, did he view Banaras—an ancient Hindu centre 
of learning and pilgrimage, and much later, a centre of Hindu revivalism under the 
patronage of the reinvented rajas of Banaras?  In his comments on Hindu ordeals, Ali 
Ibrahim Khan clearly stated that such procedures may be applicable to the territories 
of Hindu kings, but not in Banaras, which was under the Company’s rule.  There was 
more at work here than a pragmatic recognition of local political realities—for as we 
have seen, Ali Ibrahim Khan was perfectly capable of refusing to agree with British 
legal innovations that he saw as alien, and (as in the matter of mortgages) that his 
defence of existing procedures was not limited to Islamic law alone.   
 
Fortunately for us, Ali Ibrahim Khan expressed his evaluation of the Banaras 
rajas and their claims to sovereignty in a short historical work called Tarikh-i Chait 
Singh, in which he provided an eyewitness account of the Company’s conflict with 
and victory over Chait Singh.  Recent research has made us aware that scholar-
administrators of Khan’s generation had strongly held notions of what constituted 
good government and what made a good king, and that they expressed their views 
through didactic uses of history, such that the rise and fall of princes and empires was 
related to their success or otherwise in conforming to the values of the historians, and 
above all, in identifying and deferring to appropriate and reliable advisors.
68
  
 
In his version of events at Banaras,
69
 Ali Ibrahim Khan agreed in outline with 
the self-justifying narrative presented by Hastings to his Council later that year,
70
 with 
the distinct aim of establishing himself as a “well-wisher of the Company” (khair 
khwah-i kampani).  Establishing the credit score of “good servants,” was however, at 
the same time, a comment on the legitimacy of kings, since loyalty was only owed to 
those that deserved it.  Abjuring any effort to provide background to Chait Singh’s 
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efforts at resistance (which might well be construed as justifying them), Khan 
described himself as a detached spectator, travelling with Hastings from Murshidabad 
to Benares, purely with a view to “travel and seeing cities” (sair wa didan-i bilad), 
and being met by a clearly ill-intentioned raja—who came up the river to Buxar, with 
boatloads of armed soldiers.  Matters quickly escalated with the raja, who had 
revealed a “rebellious” (inḥiraf) spirit, being placed under house arrest to cure him of 
bad ideas.  Unfortunately, the Raja refused to submit to such chastisement, and 
instead escaped from confinement, while sending his soldiers rampaging across the 
city, threatening all supporters of the Company and encouraging subordinate 
“landholders” (zamindars) to go on “rebellion” (baghawat) against the Company.  
The untold suffering of the great and good (including Ali Ibrahim Khan himself) 
ended as the raja who was disloyal (idbar), had harboured “vicious intentions” 
(iradat-e faside) and had undertaken “dishonourable activities” (‘amal nashayaste), 
was “eliminated” (istisal), naturally due to the “glory of the Company” (az iqbal-e 
kampani), restoring peace and safety to the grateful inhabitants of Banaras. 
 
Although the legitimacy of this money-raising raid would eventually return to 
haunt Warren Hastings,
71
 Ali Ibrahim Khan, like other late Mughal administrators of 
his generation,
72
 saw little legitimacy in the claims of upstart zamindars such as Chait 
Singh.  The remained to  him no more than troublesome rebels; the Mughals’ bug-
bear—refractory landholders or zamindar-i zortalab.73 However, this was much less 
about religious identity than about Mughal legitimacy—thus Ali Ibrahim Khan was 
perfectly able to recognise the claims of non-Persianised soldier-kings such as the 
Marathas,
74
 despite their decidedly coarse ways, and even endow them with a 
Sassanid genealogy, on the basis that they had reformed their ways, and joined the 
service of the Mughals.  Those were indeed Hindu kings (and queens), to whom Ali 
Ibrahim Khan protested his loyalty and eagerness to be of assistance, and in whose 
realms Hindu ordeals might be legitimately carried out in court.  If this was the voice 
of the servant, it was a servant who knew that there were several masters to serve, but 
that not all who threw their weight around deserved to be kings, or to determine legal 
orders. 
 
Conclusion: Law in its place? 
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In his accounts of the rise and demise of kings, equitable legal interpretation and 
rational adjudicative procedures, Ali Ibrahim Khan repeatedly referred to two things 
—the nature of good rulers, and the importance of locale for determining good rule, 
and rules.  Thematically, therefore, he thought along similar lines as those European 
thinkers and actors who considered how distant empires may be governed—and found 
answers either in distinct ancient constitutions (actual or imagined) or in the alleged 
geographical and, increasingly, biological conditioning of potential subjects in those 
places.  While Khan may not have ventured quite as far from home—physically or 
intellectually—he too was dealing with a realm whose nature and, hence, implications 
were undecided, but whose diversity was unquestionable.  Banaras, an important 
centre of Hindu pilgrimage, was clearly no longer part of the recognisably Mughal 
structure of Awadh; it had shed an upstart raja whose descendants would discover 
their Hindu credentials several generations later, and was constantly eyed by the 
Marathas, self-consciously seeking Brahminical legitimacy.  Inside, Muslim jurists 
and judges struggled to understand British legal requirements, Brahmin pandits found 
new avenues for asserting their expert authority by citing empirically irrational 
scriptural provisions and jealous British superiors attempted to inscribe their authority 
by hastily imposing new procedural rules. 
 
In that fractured context, Ali Ibrahim Khan devised a methodology for 
reconciling conflicting legal principles and claims, and did so not by sole recourse to 
a notion of the unassailable unity of Islamic law, nor in a theory of several ancient 
laws, separable by religious affiliation, nor, again, in complete willingness to accept 
the wishes of those in power.  Instead, he worked with well-known principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence and with an administrative rationality common within his 
professional class.  The first offered him a flexible methodology of choosing from a 
number of alternative legal opinions according to the specificities of a case; the 
second allowed him to discover a supra-religious “naturalist” principle for judging the 
value of unfamiliar (not merely un-Islamic) scriptural-legal provisions.  Empiricist 
realism also led him to pose a “social-realist” challenge to the ideas of his British 
superiors.  Finally, royal transcendence, possessed by the British—and by extension—
himself, and possibly the Marathas, offered a further key principle for deciding (or at 
least) arguing which laws were suitable for which people and kingdoms.   
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If these were all centralising, organising principles, the capacious and 
accommodative principle at work in Ali Ibrahim Khan’s thought was the importance 
and legitimacy of custom.  In accommodating diversity, it was local custom he looked 
to, not scriptural texts.  Custom was legitimate, because it was familiar (hence 
shared), and also because it was attuned to local circumstances and social realities, 
crucial to ensuring justice, but unrecognised in an abstract notion of law.  Custom, in 
this case, appeared not to be a deviation from Islamic legal provisions, but 
accommodated within its formal jurisprudential parameters. 
 
It may not be possible nor productive to push further, to discover which of 
these principles, in the final instance, was considered most crucial by Ali Ibrahim 
Khan himself.  But it may be worth noting that it was to locality that he turned when 
formally assessing the value of his own work.  In an huge collectively signed 
document (mahzarnama) acknowledging the excellence of his work, garnered 
alongside letters of support for his erstwhile patron Warren Hastings, Ali Ibrahim 
Khan summarised his achievements by referring to his own probity and uprightness, a 
Solomon-like accessibility to petitioners, kingly attention to his subjects’ religious 
needs and charity during periods of social distress, “colonial” attention to maintaining 
separate court procedures for Hindus and Muslims, and resort to “customary” sources 
for identifying those procedures.  Clearly, this worked with the great and good of 
Banaras who were asked to endorse these claims.  In many languages, scripts and 
idioms, the hundreds of Banarasis who signed this gigantic mahzarnama blessed the 
East India Company and “Mr.  Hastings” for appointing “such a judge” (hamchunin 
hakim) for their city.
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Note on transliteration: I have transliterated Arabic, Persian, Hindi/Urdu and 
Sanskrit words phonetically (following South Asian pronunciation patterns), without 
diacritics, only using an apostrophe to represent the character ‘ain, and ñ for the 
nasal stop. 
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